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Philip Hamburger

Philip Hamburger

Chief Executive Officer


Philip Hamburger is a scholar of constitutional law and its history at Columbia Law School. He received his bachelor’s degree from Princeton University and his J.D. from Yale Law School. Before coming to Columbia, he was the John P. Wilson Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He also taught at George Washington University Law School, Northwestern Law School, University of Virginia Law School, and the University of Connecticut Law School. Professor Hamburger’s contributions are unrivaled by any U.S. legal scholar in driving the national conversations on the First Amendment and the separation of church and state and on administrative power. His work on administrative power has been celebrated by organizations like the Manhattan Institute and the Bradley Foundation, among others.

Vanderbilt Law Review-Chevron On Stilts: A Response to Jonathon Siegel

By: Philip Hamburger October 15, 2018
In the News
Philip Hamburger Maurice & Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School “Whither Chevron?1 For several years, some justices of the Supreme Court have been questioning Chevron deference, partly on the basis of my constitutional critique of it.2 It was inevitable that someone would stand up in defense of that doctrine, and I am glad…
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Liberty and Law Blog: Liberalism as Armed Doctrine: A Conversation with Philip Hamburger, Richard M. Reinsch II

By: Philip Hamburger August 15, 2018
In the News
“Every book that Columbia law professor Philip Hamburger writes changes discourse on a subject. The author of Separation of Church and State, Law and Judicial Duty, and the award-winning and Supreme Court cited Is Administrative Law Unlawful? now turns his inquisitive mind to the liberal mind. He joins us to discuss his latest book Liberal Suppression. Click…
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Setting the Record Straight on Reining in Big Tech

By: Philip Hamburger August 5, 2018
In the News
Last weekend, we published an essay in the Wall Street Journal arguing that Big Tech services and platforms that function as conduits for the speech of others can constitutionally be subject to state civil-rights statutes barring viewpoint discrimination. One reason for this is that they are akin to common carriers. State antidiscrimination statutes would merely…
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